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Munro: The Navigation Servitude and the Serverance Doctrine

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VI

1971

NUMBER 2

In an attempt to unravel the complexities, implications, and ramifications surrounding the mystic of the navigation servitude doctrine,
Professor Munro has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the economic, legal, and political forces associated with this doctrine. After
first examining the historical background of the doctrine, in connection with previous judicial clarifications, a comparison and criticism
of current legal commentators analysis from the viewpoint of western
water law is offered. The author concludes that the navigation servitude is a valid and viable concept basic to the federal system.

THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE AND
THE SEVERANCE DOCTRINE
James Munro*
The reality that is absolute and unconditioned may
exist, but man must know it, if at all, through its
manifestations in the conditioned and the relative.
Pragmatism is at least a working rule by which truth
is to be tested, and its attainment known.
Cardozo, Growth of the Law.

SNE fascinating

aspect of the study of Supreme Court
decisions is the frequency with which one can observe
close-up and first-hand the major stresses and strains on government. These are no dry-as-dust state papers, no devious,
ghost-written television talks to the nation, no tortuous, if
not tortured, administrative regulations produced in the
murky depths of a sprawling bureau. On the contrary, they
are the product of highly visible, very human and frequently
very able men. Cliche or not, their voice is the voice of the
Constitution-not the only one by any means, and not by any
means always the final one.
It is proposed to explore an aspect of federalism-the dimensions of the federal cognizance over navigable streams,
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specifically the navigation servitude, as it may be related to a
fairly new doctrine of federalism as it applies to water law.
This doctrine, derived from the opinion in the Pelton Dam
case, asserts on the part of the federal government, an overriding claim to the waters of streams to which the United
States may be riparian.' This doctrine, though deplored by
western legislators and many writers, has continued to hold
its own. It has in fact extended its domain by the sweeping
decision in the latest (and perhaps final) Colorado River adjudication.' Presumably, through all the reaches of the Colorado and its tributaries, the doctrine is dominant, a threat to
vested confrontation with state authorities in several states,
resulting, in some instances, in the canceling out of water
rights long vested in private or municipal hands.
It will not be the purpose here to dwell on the indefensible
basis of Pelton. That has been done.' Suffice to say that the
Court misread history, misinterpreted (or rather ignored)
the express and repeated prohibitions placed in congressional
enactments, and, worst of all, launched on the body politic a
putative federal cognizance over water for which no federal
bureaucracy has been set up and in which no federal bureaucracy could function even if it were.
To make matters worse, two propositions have been advanced by publicists: (1) the proposition that the navigation
servitude, when appropriated by the United States under the
commerce power, should be paid for; and (2) the proposition
that the Pelton doctrine can be justified on the analogy of the
navigation servitude. Thus, strangely enough, these publicists
profess to find support for Pelton in a doctrine they deem pernicious. It will be the burden of this effort to demonstrate,
hopefully with some finality: (1) that the navigation servitude is sound historically, constitutionally and practically;
and (2) that eqally sound arguments refute the dominance of
any putative federal system of water rights over the estab1.

Federal Power Comm. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), commonly known as
the Pelton Case. Munro, The Pelton Decision, a New Riparianism? 86
ORE. L. REv. 221 (1957).
2. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
3. Trelease, Arizona v. California, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 158. See also Munro
supra note 1.
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lished systems of the states in which a system of appropriation
prevails.'
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE

The river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence, and the
carrying places between the same, shall be common
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants
of the state as to the citizens of the United States,
without any tax, impost or duty therefor.
-Northwest Ordinance (1787)
There is no question that the provisions of the Ordinance
placed limitations on the states later to be carved from the
Northwest Territory. The waters, as well as the "carrying
places" between them were to remain open and free for commerce, without any restriction in the form of a tax or impost.
Later in that same year, at Philadelphia, the Convention
adopted a proposed Constitution according to the Congress
the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.''
One need not linger over the profound implications of
the Commerce Clause. Significant for present purposes,
taking the Ordinance and the Clause together, are (1) the
broad policy implications in the former, and (2) the pervasive
sweep of the consequences of the latter. Note that the Ordinance does not define navigability. Thus if Wisconsin and
Oregon found their rivers useful, as they did, for the flotation
of logs to the mill, they could adopt as their test of navigability
this particular capacity. Minnesota ("land of 10,000 lakes")
early took the view that the use of any stream or lake by
traders and voyageurs in 1858, the year of its admission, ipso
facto constituted such water resources as "navigable." Later,
this concept was extended to include recreational as well as
commercial uses, with no requirement that the 1858 situation
be controlling.' By contrast the Atlantic seaboard states
4. The following states have statutes providing for the appropriation of water:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, Wyoming.
5. U. S. CONST. Art I, § 8.
6. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 62 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
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adopted the "salt-water" test, under which navigability
extended upstream to the limit of tide-water, in many cases
a substantial distance and, historically, the geographical
limit of early settlement.7
Thus states could determine navigability for themselves,
always provided such definition did not impinge on the national control over commerce. Conflict here must be viewed
from two aspects: (1) the effect of the creation of new states
from the public domain; and (2) the exercise by Congress of
its control over interstate commerce. Typically, on the admission of a new state, the constitution of the latter would become
operative and state government would commence to function,
it being stipulated in the various enabling acts that such admission was on an "equal footing" with all other states. This
of course speaks of political consequences. Land was something else. Here, typically, the Congress would convey to the
infant state a fairly sizeable area of public lands for use in
supporting a university, public schools, a seat of government
and other purposes. All other land was retained by the United
States subject to disposition under various laws, especially
the Homestead Act of 1862. Later, as the issue of conservation became dominant in the last decade of the century, great
portions of the public domain were withdrawn from entry
under homestead laws and set aside for national parks, national forests, national monuments, wildlife reserves, historical
sites and many other purposes. Finally, in 1934, almost all remaining public land, except those in Alaska, were withdrawn
under the Taylor Grazing Act.'
On the creation of a state, the beds of navigable lakes and
streams became vested in the states; those non-navigable remained in federal ownership. This situation could provoke
questions based on assertions of title by patentees of riparian
lands. For example, if A received a patent to land bordering
a certain river considered navigable under federal standards,
A might find that he owned the bed of the stream to the midpoint of the channel or he might discover that the bed-ownership remained in state X. The Supreme Court has held that
7. Kanneberg, Wisconsin Law of Waters, 1946 Wisc. L. REv. 345, 349.
8. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-3159, 3151-315m,
315m-315p (1964). See CLAWSON AND HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS (1957).
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this determination is for the state to make.' Bed ownership
may be said to be of minor importance, but it can assume
significance as, for example, where the bed dries up and may
be the source of valuable minerals."0
While the states were thus accorded the privilege of defining navigability as an aspect of local law, the Supreme Court
quite logically made it clear that insofar as the control over
commerce was concerned, more specifically the Commerce
Clause, plenary power remained in Congress." So it was that
rivers, not previously regarded as navigable, could be considered such if they could be made navigable. 2 Implicit in this
thinking was a residual control in Congress of the smallest
river or pond."' All of which is good doctrine, traceable directly to the constitutional pediments erected by Chief Justice Marshall. 4
THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE AND PBE-PELTON WATER LAW

Fierce controversy has raged in and out of the Supreme
Court over the payment of compensation for land taken in
connection with a hydro-electric project. The issue could be
stated in these terms: since the navigation servitude is owned
by the federal government, any use of the government, or its
licensee, need not be compensated, for the obvious reason that
the government should not be compelled to pay for what it
already owns. Does this mean in practice that all values dependent on or connected with the servitude can be disregarded ?
Chief Justice Marshall laid down the broad outlines of
the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden. As early as 1865,
the Court explicitly ruled that navigable waters are public
property of the nation, and subject to all direct legislation by
Congress.' 6 Since this was property interest, any interference with navigable waters would be subject to Congressional
regulation, e.g. building of bridges, dams, locks. In modern
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
Lamprey v. Metcalf, supra note 6.
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
Id.
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id.
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wail.) 713 (1866).
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terms the issue was first squarely put in United States v.
Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co.' The government there
condemned properties riparian to the St. Mary's River in
Upper Michigan. The Court was admirably explicit in denying
compensation for land to be used as a factory site for companies using the power to be generated by the hydro dam.
"The government," said Justice Burton, "had dominion over
the water power of the rapids and falls and cannot be required
to pay any hypothetical additional value to a riparian owner
who had no right to appropriate the current to his own commercial use."'" On the other hand, this jurat was, at least in
the minds of many commentators, weakened by the allowance
of compensation for another plot of land suitable for a lock
and canal. It was "the only land available for the purpose"
and
Although it is not proper to estimate land condemned
for public purposes by the public necessities or its
worth to the public . . .it is proper to consider the

fact that the property is so situated that it will probably be desired and available for such a purpose."
In the 1950's, with power demands rising everywhere
and fortunes to be made in the generation and distribution of
electric power, the Supreme Court found itself deciding a
whole series of condemnation cases. In this period, the Court
tried to deal with the various volatile elements of power policy,
particularly the legacy, one might say the clouded legacy of
Chandler-Duinbar. The one prime example of the effect of
various forces was the 1956 case, United States v. Twin City
Power Co.2 , in which a five man minority based its holdings
directly on Chandler-Dunbar. Justice Burton, speaking for
the dissenters, referred to the ambiguity of Chandler-Dunbar
and to a more recent holding-United States v. Kansas City
Life Insurance Co.2 as denying compensation for "upland"
i.e. above high water mark, values.
If one might venture a speculation on Supreme Court
method, there would appear to be considerable validity to
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

229
Id.,
Id.,
350
339

U.S. 53 (1913).
at 76.
at 77.
U.S. 222 (1956).
U.S. 799 (1950).
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the argument that the Court attempts to avoid a purely "administrative" role in handling recurring cases raising complex issues. The Court appears to be looking with one eye on
the case at hand, and with the other to the future. To achieve
a degree of consistency and yet permit a degree of flexibility
and growth, it will find itself under pressure from those who
would advocate an "absolute" standard at the same moment
as other pressures would demand a less static approach. Some
would question whether judicial "absolutes" should ever be
erected."
Certainly it would appear that if they have a place, it
might be in the realm of major constitutional protections
such as freedom of speech and of religion. Arguably, though,
the economic sphere is one in which a high degree of certainty
is desirable. The urgency may be especially strong in the administration of the Federal Power Act for the reason that,
since the hydro-electric features may be built either by the
government or by a licensee, there is quite naturally sound
business inducement to acquire power sites as a preliminary
to making formal application for a license. The rub comes, in
the humble view of this critic, when a person (usually a corporate entity or someone acting for such an entity) acquires
riparian lands at considerable cost with the bona fide intention of securing a license to build a dam. Such a venturesome
entrepreneur knows, or should know, that the government
may, in due time, decide to construct the dam itself, or to
build a much larger structure at or near the site.
The company can be assured that whatever interests it
may have or claim in the bed or banks of the stream below
ordinary high water mark are completely non-compensable.2 3
Above that mark the matter becomes difficult. Case analysis,
here, as elsewhere, may be inadequate to identify the obvious,
much less to clarify the obscure. It should be obvious, on the
one hand, that land or interests in land must be compensated,
but that such compensation must include no element of value
(or of incremental value) existing only by virture of the situs
being useful for hydro-electric purposes. On the other hand,
22. See, Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-a discussion of the Approach of the
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REy. 167 (1963).
23. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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it can be decidedly obscure to work out a formula which will
fairly compensate the landowner without paying him for
interests whose value is somehow dependent on the navigation
servitude.
Another ground for discontent is the apparent extension
of the concept of "navigability" in the federal sense. Thus,
it had been assumed for at least a century that navigable
waters within the purview of the Commerce Clause were those
which were navigable in fact, that is, waters which "form in
their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with
other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or
may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the
customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by
water." 2 But this concept has been upgraded. Navigable
waters now include those "which either in their natural or
improved condition" are used or suitable for use in commerce.2 5 Indeed, the pervasive nature of the commerce power
is such as to reach to non-navigable streams as well.2"
So much by way of brief background to Twin City. 7 A
focal point in the continuing controversy over the real meaning of Chandler-Dunbar,it has a fitting breadth and sweep,
The term "Twin City" refers to two corporations with that
name, the Georgian component being owned by the South
Carolina. As early as 1901, Twin City began acquiring the
necessary land and rights looking to the construction of a
dam on the Savannah River, dividing the two states. From
1901 to 1919, it was authorized to build dams by no less than
six acts of Congress. In 1926, the Federal Power Commission
tendered a preliminary permit for a dam at Price's Island.
Later, the Savannah River Electric Company held a permit
to construct a project at Clark Hill, a larger undertaking
which would have necessitated taking over the Twin City
holdings. No construction was initiated and, in 1944, Congress
formally authorized Clark Hill, a major federal plan for a
multi-purpose storage reservoir, to provide flood control, pro24. The Daniel Ball 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
25. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); 16 U.S.C.
§ 796 (8) (1954).
26. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46 (1907).
27. United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 20.
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mote navigation and generate power. Proceedings were had
to condemn lands in both states and, as the case came before
the Supreme Court, the focal point was the compensation to
be paid for 4,700 acres, a small but extremely important part
of the entire property complex to be needed. In round figures,
the land would be valued, without regard to its potential as a
site for hydro-electric power, at $150,000. Taking the power
potential into consideration, it would be $1,257,000.
Justices Douglas and Burton both relied largely on
Chandler- Dunbar. The former emphasized on theme: the
appropriation by the United States of the entire flow of the
river. It is useless to argue that upland should be compensated
for if the value in question depends on the flow of the stream. 8
Justice Burton phrased the issue in these terms: "the determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for privately owned fast land adjoining a navigable stream when
such land is taken ... for public use." 2 In general, Burton
stuck to the theme, reiterated and without noticeable variations, that the navigation servitude, properly described, concerned only lands and interests below high water mark. It is
suggested that Justice Burton, by meeting Douglas on his own
ground, achieved a sweeping polarization which, however,
useful as grist for commentators, marked a lost opportunity
to discriminate between different aspects of the land taken.
For example, a good part of the 4,700 acres was plainly needed
for the reservoir itself. Indeed, Twin City had a flowage easement for 188 acres. Burton did say: "The latter are significant because a market for flowage rights is a recognition of
a special value of the land for that use." 8
In the sequel to Twin City, the Court, this time with a
special concurrence by Douglas, conceded that compensation
31
should be allowed for the taking of a flowage easement.
Professor Bartke, among others, has subjected the decision to
critical analysis. The company, known as Vepco, had acquired
a flowage easement covering 1540 acres (of the 1,840 total
flowage easements necessary for the project). The govern28. Id., at 225.
29. Id., at 229.
30. Id., at 232.
31. United States v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
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ment paid the fee owner one dollar and then brought condemnation proceedings against Vepco. Ultimately, a Supreme
Court majority upheld compensation under this formula:
"The value of the land for all purposes, other than for hydroelectric development, discounted by the probability of the exercise of the easement by the power company." Three dissenters
would deny all relief on the ground that the decision to build
the dam by the government eliminated all value the easement
had. Douglas, concurring with the majority, would permit
compensation because the fee owner (and his grantee) has
no property rights dependent on the flow of the stream, or
from the strategic location on it, but they did have Fifth
Amendment rights.
Professor Bartke submits that since the easement (Vepco's) was exclusive, the Government had to acquire it. Decision should have been rested on that ground. Without acquiring the right to flood the fast lands, the government would
have been a tortfeasor. If the easement were non-exclusive,
both government and Vepco could have flooded the lands.
What would have prevented the power company from
exercising the rights granted to it by the easement
would have been the failure of the government to
grant it a license to construct a dam. But the government's failure to grant a license is not compensable.
The error of both the majority and the dissent lies in
concentrating on the navigation servitude in a case
which does not fall within its ambit at all. 82
While Vepco seemingly pointed the way to amelioration
of the rigors of the Twin City doctrine, any faint hopes along
these lines were dashed in United States v. Rands.3" Of that
32. Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Trust Compensation-Struggle For
A Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REV. 1, 19 (1968), A different analysis appears in:
Compensable Values in Federal"Taking" of Damsites, 14 STAN. L. REV. 800

(1962).
The essence of the Twin City Doctrine was likewise not affected by United
States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960). The State
(acting through the Authority) had originally planned three projects on
the non-navigable Grand River. Ultimately the State built two and the
Federal Government constructed the Ft. Gibson unit, the farthest downstream. In addition to items for which compensation was paid (e.g. a 70
acre tract at the damsite and flowage rights over the Authority's lands) the
State claimed, but was denied, compensation for the "taking" of water power
rights at Ft. Gibson. Congress may, in its judgment, decide to "treat the
watersheds [of non-navigable streams] as a key to flood control on navigable streams and their tributaries". Oklahoma v. Atkinson 313 U.S. 508,
525 (1941).

33.

389 U.S. 121 (1967).
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pronouncement more later, but first a bit of back-tracking
to the other main branch of post-war water law-that dealing
with federal pretensions to an overriding cognizance (which
may not be the apt word) over waters from streams and lakes
to which the federal government is riparian.
The writer has referred to the decision in the famous
Pelton case 4 as enumerating a "new riparianism" and as
casting doubt on western water rights and indeed on the whole
system of appropriation as practiced in the seventeen western
"reclamation" states.35 It was the burden of that article that
the federal government, in asserting (and having that assertion confirmed by the Court) the right to utilize the waters
of streams, navigable or non-navigable, passing through or
along federal enclaves, or more specifically "reserved" lands
of the United States, had opened the door to confusion and
conflict in federal-state relations, and, more ominously, to a
general clouding of water rights long recognized as appurtenant to land in those states. It is not proposed here to recapitulate that thesis. It is proposed to deal with the attempts by
some scholars to intrepret both lines of decision, the condemnation cases on the one hand, and Pelton and its progeny on
the other, in terms of a perfectly valid and reasonable aspect
of federal power.
PROFESSOR MORREALE'S CONTENTION

Pelton, predictably, raised hackles. Its opponents, no
doubt unintentionally, drew return fire-and from quite respectable sources. It is not surprising that these writers should
link the condemnation cases and the Pelton and pre-Pelton
decisions, although the Court itself would in ordinary course
refrain. Professor Morreale appears as the leader of a new
school of thought that simultaneously: (a) deplores the extension (or perhaps even the retention) of the navigation
servitude; and (b) welcomes the demise, or threatened demise,
of the system of western water rights."6
34. Munro, The Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?, supra note 1.
35. Id., at 222.
36. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1
(1963). A later article by the same author dealing with various bills
designed to ward off the effects of Pelton will not be discussed here. See,
Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State
Conflicts Over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 33 (1968).
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In capsule form, she submits that the Court has been
wrong in Twin City-indeed wrong in adhering to the concept of a navigation servitude in any form-but right in Pelton
and in the latest edition (1963) of Arizona v. California.7 In
the course of this exercise, Professor Morreale has given
currency to some basic misconceptions of western water law, in
its historical, economic and political context. On the other
prong, she has raised disturbing questions as the utility of the
navigation servitude under any circumstances. As the Court
is still engaged in attempts to reconcile past inconsistencies
in both fields and to find out of the wilderness, it may be useful to discuss her arguments not, it is hoped, in doctrinaire
terms, but with due regards to constituent factors of non-legal
as well as legal significance.
THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
The concept of the navigation servitude is derived, so
Professor Morreale states, from the commerce power. It is a
power to regulate, but in the exercise of other powers to regulate, Congress must compensate for property taken."' "Congress may thus destroy or impair with impunity certain private rights and values in water courses-for which it would
have to pay full compensation were it to destroy the same,
Quite
identical rights in the exercise of a different power."I
so, provided her assumption that this is the exercise of a regulatory power can stand up. But now square that assumption
with the words of Justice Lurton:
[W]hen Congress determined, as it did by the Act of
March 3, 1909, that the whole river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as
all of the upland north of the present ship canal,
throughout its etire length, was "necessary for the
purposes of navigation of said waters and the waters
connected therewith," that determination was conelusive."0
87. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
38. For a similar position See, Corker, Water Rights and Federalism, 45 CAxaF.
L. REv. 604, 618 (1957).
39. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters, supra note 36 at 20.
40. Supra note 17 at 65.
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This is a far cry from a mere regulatory power. It is in
effect ownership of the entire stream-flow. Thus the navigation servitude is regarded as a property right under the administration of the Congress. If that property right is appropriated by others, it makes little sense to insist that the government should pay to reclaim its own property. The term" navigation servitude" is in no sense a "shorthand expression for
the rule that in the exercise of the navigation power certain
private property may be taken with out compensation." 4' If
anything it is shorthand for "navigation servitude".
To put it another way, effective application of the commerce power to navigable watercourses made it not desirable
but mandatory that the rights of the government were supreme. This was the purport of Justice Lurton's statement.2
It would be futile to try and compare this kind of overriding
power, in effect ownership of the stream-flow, to the taking
of private property as an incident of, say, the war power. Payment of compensation for private property acquired under
that power would obviously be necessary.43 That the government, in constructing a reclamation project under the general
welfare provision of the Constitution, would be compelled to
pay compensation for water rights which may be taken need
not pose a serious problem." There would, admittedly, be a
problem and a serious one if the government's contention in
that case (Gerlach) had prevailed, namely, that since this was
a "navigation" project, or navigation was included as one of
the Congressional purposes, no compensation need be paid. It
bothers Professor Morreale, it would seem that depending on
the label fixed to the project, compensation for water rights
and no doubt other property may or may not be demanded.
The difficulties, it is submitted, are more important than real.
The Reclamation Act has 68 years of experience to go on, and
there is nothing in that experience to suggest that Congress
41. Morreale, FederalPower in Western Waters, supra note 86 at 19.
42. Professor Bartke shows that as early as 1865, the Supreme Court emphasized "the proprietary nature of the national interests in navigable waters,
in connection with the commerce clause. Commerce includes navigation . . .
For this purpose they [navigable waters] are the public property of the
nation, and subject to all direct legislation by congress." Quoting from
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-5 (1865). 48 ORE. L.
REv. 1 at 4.
43. Supra note 17 at 65.
44. Professor Morreale cites International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
399 (1931).
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will seek by fundamental amending legislation, to force the
reclamation features of water projects into a different mold.
As Justice Jackson so aptly put it in Gerlach:
[W]e need not ponder whether by virtue of a highly
fictional navigation purpose, the government could
destroy the flow of a navigable stream and carry away
its waters for sale to private interests without compensation to those deprived of them. We have never
held that or anything like it, and we need not here
pass on any question of constitutional power; for we
do not find that Congress has attempted to take or
authorized the taking, without compensation, or any
rights valid under State law.4"
Jackson, it must be conceded, does not exclude the possibility of legislation depending on valid, not "fictional" exercise of the navigation power. Indeed, the post-war trend
towards multi-purpose projects points up the immediacy of
such development. But at least two persuasive reasons would
prevent the uncompensated taking of existing water rights:
(a) the historical background of western water and property
law with its important bastion of the severance doctrine,
whereby waters from non-navigable sources were considered
as severed from the public domain and, as such, subject to
recognition under whatever property law (riparian or appropriative) the various states had adopted, or would adopt ;4"
(b) the insistence by Congress, beginning with the Reclamation Act of 1902 and continuing in the Water Power Act [1920]
and other acts on the vested nature of state-created water
rights. One could go back further and point out the "right of
way" acts, beginning in 1891, as being fundamentally inconsistent with the reserved land doctrine announced in Pelton.
Professor Morreale would reject any supposed distinction4 7 between the exercise of "power" by Congress or the
45. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 727 (1950).
46. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935).
47. The rights-of-way acts, beginning in 1891, specifically granted to canal and
ditch companies rights of way "through the public lands and reservations of
the United States." Act of March 3, 1891, 26 STAT. 1101 (1891), 43 U.S.C.,
§ 946 (1954). A later act authorized the Secretary of the Interior, under
general regulations to be promulgated by him, "to permit the use of rights
of way through the public lands, . . .and . . . reservations of the United
States . . .for water plants, dams, and reservoirs used to promote irrigation .. of any other beneficial uses to the extent of the ground occupied
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exercise of "superior power." She refers to NiagaraMohawk
as being based on the proposition that Congress had not made
it clear that it was asserting its superior power over navigation. Hence, the majority held, it was proper that in working
out amortization payments. The federal licensee should be
compensated for the payments made and to be made under
contracts for the acquistion of the necessary water rights.48
Such a distinction was inadmissible, since all "powers of the
United States are superior." [p. 21] Quite so, and two years
later, Justice Douglas, now speaking for the majority, established a far broader base for the extent to which the navigation servitude doctrine would deny compensation to upland
property interests."
0
Mention has been made of United States v. Rands."
Claimant had leased certain land to the state (Oregon) an option to the state to purchase. The state planned to use the land
as an industrial park, part of which would function as a port.
Before the option could be exercised, the federal government
condemned the land in connection with the John Day hydroelectric dam project on the Columbia River. Later, the land
was conveyed to the state at a figure much less than the option
price. The Court of Appeals had referred to a 1926 decision
which ruled that since incidental benefit to property not
taken, i.e. benefit in the form of access to navigable water not
previously available to such property, this benefit, or rather
its value, should be deducted from the award. 5 By a parity of
reasoning, if the availability of land as a port site is taken,
there should be compensation. But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that rights such as access to navigation, while
valuable vis-a-vis the state or other private parties, could not
be asserted against the United States.

48.
49.
50.

51.

by such canals." 31 STAT. 790 (1901), 43 U.S.C., § 959 (1954). It remains
a curious fact that of the many articles and comments dealing with Pelton
and other cases following it, this writer can find no mention of these acts.
Why should Congress, in 1891, hope to promote the economy of the west, by
making water sources in the national forests available to irrigators, in
legislation which, sub silentio, can now be said to contain a proviso that
in these very areas, the United States was to retain full rights as riparian
owner? This part of the Pelton holding made no sense fifteen years ago.
It makes no sense now.
F.P.C. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 348 U.S. 910 (1956).
389 U.S. 121 (1967).
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
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Justice Burton, speaking for the Court in Pelton, recognized this doctrine as set forth in the Beaver-Portlandcase.5"
The vice of Pelton consisted in its announcement of the reserved lands doctrine and its direct refusal to comply with the
mandate of the Federal Power Act with respect to securing
state consent to the construction of a hydro project. The first
was more disturbing since it appeared to open a Pandora's
box of confusion.s
Since her general thesis asserts that if the navigation
servitude can succeed in taking vested private rights without
benefit of Fifth Amendment compensation, the immunity
would likewise apply to irrigation projects in which "navigation" is posited as a basis for Congressional action. Professor
Morreale supports at least pro forma, the argument advanced
in Beaver-Portland.4 She proceeds to argue that if the 160acre limitation stands on the basis of the conditioning of the
rights by this limitation, "There could be just as little doubt
regarding the constitutionality of an express prior provision
subjecting such 'vested rights' as were involved in Ickes v.
Fox" to the navigation power, if and "when changed conditions make its subsequent exercise necessary or desirable." 6
The trouble with the Morreale thesis is that it proves too
much. One could argue, with equal plausibility, that since
every piece of land (except in Texas and the 13 original states)
was at one time part of the public domain, and that since every
such parcel is part of a water-shed whose surface waters, be
they rivulets or Mississippi's, are, or could be, important to
navigation, the government could reclaim all such lands. By a
parity of reasoning, no doubt Congress could repeal the preemption and homestead legislation and declare that all lands
in private hands under that legislation should be, as of a given
52. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 46.
53. See Munro supra note 1 at 250 where possible difficulties are suggested.
Some of these chickens have arrived back at the roost, as is mentioned in an
article to appear soon in the Oregon Law Review.
54. Others have attacked Beaver Portland directly. Goldberg, InterpositionWild West Style, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (1964); Sax Federalism in
Reclamation Law, 37 U. OF COLO. L. REV. 49, 62 (1964).
55. 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
56. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters, supra note 36. The Morreale
view is also supported by Rossi, The Public Right of Navigation and the
Rule of No Compensation 44 N.D.L. REV. 235 (1968).
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date, revested in the federal government. Absurd as the suggestion is, Professor Morreale deals with property rights no
less firmly settled. Intellectual arguments, no matter how
stimulating or even persuasive, cannot readily dispose of the
cold fact that "water rights have already vested in private
persons for the irrigation of 18 million acres, and that the private property values dependent upon these vested rights are
estimated at between 15 and 20 billions of dollars.""
As Martz recognizes, there must be a federal role in water
resource development. He cites four reasons for the necessity
of this role: (1) as trustees of our common welfare, the goveminent has a responsibility for "leadership in the development of limited resources that bear so heavily upon the security and economic well-being of the entire country;" (2) the
national government is ideally situated to exert this leadership; otherwise sectional rivalries would impair the effectiveness of programs; (3) the federal government can provide the
capital not available at the local level; (4) engineering problems are common to all projects; central planning agency is
necessary.58 A factor militating against an effective federal
role, Martz contends, is the "non-quantification" of water
rights asserted by the government. Referring to the large,
but seemingly open-end claims recognized in Pelton and Ari9 he observes:
zon v. California,"
From the first water legislation in 1866, Congress
recognized private rights in these waters to the extent
they are vested under state laws. Substantially all
of the available water has so vested and is critically
needed for resource development. That development
is deterred, and a valuable resource lost to present
economic use, by title insecurity that flows from nonquantification of paramount federal claims. '""
Martz, The Role of the Government in State Water Law, 5 KANs. L. REv.
626, 631 (1957).
58. Id., at 627.
59. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

57.

60.

Martz, The Role of Government in Public Resources Management, 15 ROCKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1969). Cf. Trelease on appropriation doctrine: Several

features combine to make an appropriation a property right of a high order.
An appropriation is always defined in terms of the right to take a specific
quantity of water. This, coupled with the element of priority gives the
western appropriator's rights a unique stability. Arizona v. California, 1963
SuP. CT. REV. 142, 186.
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But Martz is hardly a defender of the Pelton and related
cases asserting large, unmeasured federal rights in streams
and rivers. Since 1920, and particularly since 1935, he writes,
the United States has "whittled away at state and private
rights to a point that the non-project appropriator has little
security in the continued operation of his diversion facilities
and little opportunity for independent development of new
sources of supply." Where all else failed, the government
has asserted property rights in all non-navigable waters flowing through or past government land. 1
CONCLUSION

One can adhere to concepts of federal supremacy without
thereby supporting decisions which tend to undermine the
bases of property law, especially that aspect of property law
dealing with water rights in the western states. The bugaboo
of some commentators appears to be akin of parochialism rearing its ugly head to defeat broad federal programs having the
national interest as their primary objective. The hard fact
is that, through its control of the financing of projects, the
federal government has found it quite practical to promote its
programs of multi-purpose projects. At the same time it has
found that it must respect property rights even where the
government project supposedly promotes a greater good than
is represented by those property rights."
The navigation servitude, derived from the commerce
power under the constitution, has been the recipient of special
solicitude at the hands of the Supreme Court. Justifiably or
not, the Court has adhered to the basic doctrines announced by
Marshall and Taney to the effect that the highways of commerce must be kept open. Early enactment of the Northwest
Ordinance under the Constitution reflected the strong motive
of the founders that the streams, rivers and "carrying places"
be kept open for the purpose of commerce. Federal tests of
navigability did not necessarily coincide with state tests. Indeed, the interests of the state may have been influenced by
local conditions (use by Indians in 1858 in Minnesota for tra61. 5 KANS. L. Ray. 626, at 635.
62. Dugan v. Rann, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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vel; the "saw-log" test in Wisconsin etc.) and, so long as no

federal rights were violated, such local interpretations would
be honored.
With the construction of huge hydro-dams as multipurpose projects, embracing flood control, navigation, maintenance of stream flow, recreation, the federal concept of
navigability expanded. This led to difficulty and controversy in the field of valuation, where lands were taken for
power purposes. This developing controversy was resolved,
though perhaps not finally, in Twin City and later in Rands,
where the Court interpreted earlier cases as requiring that
practically all elements of value in any way connected with
the possible use of stream-flow should be non-compensable.
It seems questionable that the Court should go so far as to
deny compensation where upland is taken for flowage easement. In Vepco, such rights were held compensable, though
not in Twin City. Finally, Rands announced that projected
use by the state of upland as a port site and idustrial park
could not be compensated despite doubts that the second use,
at least, did not appear to be dependent on stream flow.6"
The thesis of Professor Morreale that in some fashion the
expanding concept of the navigation servitude could properly
be applied in the case of irrigation projects, though arresting
as an intellectual exercise, has little to commend it. With due
apologies for repeated iteration, it must be acknowledged that,
rightly or wrongly, the government decided to sever the water
from the land in disposing of land in the arid west. Rightly or
wrongly, Congress permitted-one might say encouragedthe states to establish their own systems covering the acquisition, maintenance and loss of water rights. Over the years
federal agencies have respected these state-created rights,
but in more recent years, efforts have been made to assert a
claim to these waters. At one time, the claim was to be "unappropriated" waters in non-navigable streams. [Nebraska v.
Wyoming] Later, with the surprising holding in Pelton in
1955, the federal agencies found themselves in the position of
claiming the use of any and all waters passing along or through
federal enclaves, i.e. reserved lands. But the joker in this pack
63. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
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turns out to be the fact that practically all federal lands are
now "reserved" for one purpose or another.
In quick summary:
1. The navigation servitude is a valid concept basic to our
federal system.
2. If the Supreme Court has expanded this concept beyond a defensible basis under the original idea of navigation
servitude, the Court should modify its previous holdings.
3. The Pelton case (and Arizona v. California) have
raised serious questions as to the validity of western water
rights. They should be re-examined without reference to any
current views on navigation.
4. Federal agencies should be encouraged to work with
the states, recognizing state cognizance over the acquisition
and enforcement of water rights. One bureaucracy, that of the
state concerned, should handle this function.
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